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Abstract
Geo-Social Networks (GeoSNs) extend social networks by providing context-aware services that support the as-
sociation of location with users and content. We are witnessing a proliferation of GeoSNs, and indications are that
these are rapidly attracting increasing numbers of users. The availability of user location yields new capabilities that
provide benefits to users as well as service providers. GeoSNs currently offer different types of services, including
photo sharing, friend tracking, and “check-ins.” However, the introduction of location generates new privacy threats,
which in turn calls for new means of affording user privacy in GeoSNs.
This article categorizes GeoSNs according to the services they offer; it studies three privacy aspects that are
central to GeoSNs, namely location, absence, and co-location privacy; and it discusses possible means of providing
these kinds of privacy, as well as presents unresolved privacy-related challenges in GeoSNs.
1 Introduction
It is a recent trend in online social networks to enable the publication of geo-located information in real time. Many
existing services are designed specifically to enable this functionality, and other services are increasingly assimilating
these features. Examples include Facebook, Foursquare, Twitter, Google Latitude, Flickr, Gowalla, Loopt and MyTown.
We call such services Geo Social Networks (GeoSNs): they combine real-time location capabilities with traditional social
network functionality.
Indeed, the availability of location enables new possibilities, one example being the so-called check-ins, where users
register when they arrive at locations. A business may offer discounts to those who check-in at their location, thus
attracting more customers. In addition to benefiting from the discounts, users are able to identify popular places.
The social networks of users enrich the functionality. For instance, a recommendation service that shows the currently
popular places in town (by using check-ins) can highlight places that are popular among a user’s friends.
Privacy advocates have warned about the dangers of exposing location information. The association of a user with
a specific location can reveal health problems, affiliations, habits, etc. The availability of locations in real time even
introduces threats such as assault. GeoSNs exacerbate the risks, as the spread of location information occurs more easily
and is less controllable.
We use the term location privacy to denote the sensitivity of the association between a user’s identity and the
user’s location, be it the user’s past, current, or anticipated future locations. Knowing the location of a user also has
implications for where the user cannot be located. This introduces the risk of burglary of unattended locations such as
homes. We use absence privacy to denote the privacy of sensitive, unattended places. Absence privacy is ensured by
avoiding the release of the association between a user’s identity and the user’s absence from sensitive locations. Location
information can also be used to determine sensitive associations among users. Thus, user location traces may reveal
that certain users have been together, possibly frequently and for extended time periods. We use the term co-location
privacy to refer to the privacy of co-location events. Users enjoy co-location privacy if the co-location information about
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the users is not associated with their identities.
GeoSNs should offer their users the possibility to specify when, how, and to whom their information should be
exposed. To do so, GeoSNs should support different kinds of relationships and different accuracies of location information.
This article offers an overview of existing GeoSNs and their location privacy-related mechanisms, and it describes the
requirements of protection techniques that can be applied to GeoSNs.
2 Key Concepts and Classification of GeoSNs
2.1 Overview
GeoSNs extend social networks by enabling the association of location with users and content. Figure 1 depicts the
main concepts in GeoSNs, including their relationships.
Figure 1: GeoSN Concepts
A user is an individual who subscribes to a GeoSN. Users can establish online relationships with other users, and the
GeoSN in turn uses such relationships to enrich the services provided. The relationships are established by the users as
a way of capturing real-life relations (family, co-worker, friend, etc.) or indicating affinities or common interests; they
can be symmetric or asymmetric. Symmetric relationships, e.g., friendship in Facebook Places, require both users to
approve the association, whereas asymmetric relationships, e.g., one form of follow in Twitter, do not require approval
from the followed party. In the sequel, we use friendship and follow to denote symmetric and asymmetric relationships,
respectively.
A GeoSN often allows its users to publish user-generated content, either to all or some of the users. This content
may be associated with location, called geotagging, and with users, called user tagging. When publication of content is
the key purpose of a service, we call it a content-centric GeoSN.
A user is located by means of a location update, which takes two forms: in some services, users can update their
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location only at certain, predefined places (check-in), whereas other services are capable of continuously tracking a user.
We call these check-in based and tracking-based GeoSNs.
Content and users can be associated with locations, and locations can be associated with content and users. Most
GeoSNs are location centric in the sense that they enable convenient retrieval of content according to location. Thus,
Flickr shows photos on a map, and Facebook Places discloses the people who are currently in a place.
Figure 2 reviews features of existing GeoSNs and classifies these into content-centric, check-in based and tracking-
based GeoSNs. The characteristics of each group are described next.
2.2 Content-Centric GeoSNs
Content-centric GeoSNs allow their users to publish and share content such as notes, status updates, microblogging
entries, traffic reports, photos, and videos. Examples include photo sharing services with social network capabilities
such as Google Picasa and Flickr, as well as mobile micro-blogging services such as Twitter and Google Buzz. Content
can be geotagged, thus enabling location-based search and retrieval and other services.
For some services, as illustrated by Figure 2, accurate location and time information are not strictly necessary.
For instance, Twitter does not require publication of an exact location—rather, the geotag can be omitted or can be
generalized to a coarser location (e.g., neighborhood, city). However, Twitter requires content to be published in real
time. Other services focus on content that characterizes places, like reviews of businesses (e.g. Yelp, Qype). This calls
for a location, but publication needs not occur in real time, and can use a pseudonym or be anonymous.
User tags associate content with related users. For instance, when uploading a photo to Picasa, users are allowed to
tag other users that appear in the photo. User tags establish a link from a user to that content and make it accessible
from the tagged users’ profiles. The location of a user can be obtained from the geotags of content associated with the
user: although a geotag is associated with a piece of content, the geotag implicitly tags the user with which the content
is tagged. User tags are typically entered manually. However, the latest improvements in face recognition are starting
to enable automatic user tagging (e.g., people suggestions in Picasa).
Users express diverging feelings about automatic user tagging [1]. One concern is that undesired content may become
accessible to other users from a user’s profile before the user’s approval. A possible benefit is that if content related to a
user is linked to the user, the user can be aware of its existence. The support in current GeoSNs for privacy preferences
for content uploaded by other users is scarce.
2.3 Check-In Based GeoSNs
Check-in based social networks allow users to announce their presence in a particular place, such as a bar, a shop, or a
park. The possible places are restricted to a finite set of points of interest and associated businesses, and the available
places depend on the scope of the service. Users are in many cases allowed to submit new places. Examples include
Facebook Places, Foursquare, Gowalla, Whrrl, and MyTown.
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A check-in is normally performed manually by a user, and it is published instantly. Their visibility can be restricted
to friends and to other users located in the same place, and it can be hidden from other users. Some services have
adopted a popular gaming style in which users must perform certain challenges and are ranked based on performance, or
are offered earn virtual rewards or real-world deals. Location-based social gaming services allow the use of pseudonyms
instead of real identities.
Some services offer the possibility of doing a single check-in of multiple users (e.g., Facebook Places). However,
analogously to user tagged content, users do not usually have control over the check-ins in which they are tagged.
2.4 Tracking-Based GeoSNs
Tracking-based services allow users to continually share their location with other users and to visualize other users’
locations. However, different from check-in based services, the locations are retrieved automatically from a smartphone
or similar. Users communicate their location by transmitting their latitude and longitude, and the list of possible
locations is not restricted to a set of possible values. Services include Google Latitude and Loopt.
While these services have seen a significant growth in popularity, some users have concerns about constantly releasing
their location to a wide audience. Google Latitude supports manual location updates, which gives full control to the
user about when and where a location is disclosed. A subcategory of these services are the proximity-based services
that allow users to discover nearby users. In some services, like online dating such as MeetMoi and Grindr, the other
users are not necessarily friends of the user. Tracking services often allow the use of pseudonyms, especially when the
participation of a user in a service is sensitive.
3 Privacy threats in GeoSN
3.1 Threat Categories
A privacy threat occurs when an adversary can associate a user’s identity with information that the user considers
sensitive. GeoSNs expose users to several privacy threats due to the release of spatio-temporal information. As in
location-based services in general, two major categories of threats exist: (a) re-identification through location and (b)
release of sensitive location information.
The former refers to the ability of an adversary to reduce the degree of anonymity of a user by considering location
information. For example, by knowing that an (anonymous) GeoSN user was in a given place at a given time, an
adversary may exclude several candidate individuals and possibly identify the user. If the user considers being a user of
the GeoSN as sensitive, the re-identification is a privacy violation.
While we have seen that some GeoSNs allow the use of pseudonyms, this practice does not prevent this type of
re-identification. GeoSNs, like proximity-based dating services and location-based social gaming for which anonymity
can be particularly important, are exposed to this type of threat.
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The latter category applies to cases in which the identity of the user is known and certain location information
should not be associated by any adversary with the user. We have seen that some GeoSNs allow users to release location
information to other users at a coarser granularity than actually available. This can be considered a way of avoiding
this type of threat, based on the idea that the sensitivity of location data decreases at coarser granularities. We will see
that current GeoSN privacy protection offers inadequate means of protecting against this category of threats.
We proceed to consider in more detail the threats related to the release of sensitive location information, since it is
particularly important in GeoSNs.
3.2 Location Privacy
Revealing one’s own exact location to other users is probably one of the most common concerns among GeoSN users.
Indeed, the association of the user’s identity with a specific location at a given time can reveal sensitive information
such as health problems, affiliations, and habits. If we consider the user’s identity as known to the adversary, protecting
this association using anonymity-based techniques is not effective. Instead, it is necessary to obfuscate the location
information available to an adversary, so that it is no longer sensitive according to the user.
3.3 Absence Privacy
The publication of a user’s location can enable an adversary to infer how far the user is from a certain sensitive location
at a given time. It is also easy for an adversary to compute, by considering maximum velocity and other constraints, a
minimum interval of time during which the user could not be at the sensitive location. As an example, the adversary
may estimate how long a user may be away from home, and may use this information to plan a burglary. As another
example, a manager may determine that an employee was far away from work during work hours. In both examples,
the release of location information represents an absence privacy violation.
3.4 Co-Location Privacy
In a check-in based GeoSN, it may be possible for one user to observe the simultaneous presence of other users, say,
Alice and Bob, in the same place. Alice does not consider her presence in the place as sensitive, and neither does she
consider it sensitive that Bob is a GeoSN friend. But she does consider it sensitive that she is in the same place as Bob.
The disclosure of this information to an adversary that can identify Alice and Bob is a co-location privacy violation.
The example can be generalized to consider as sensitive the frequent co-location with one or more specific users.
Intuitively, the location information that can be obtained by a GeoSN user by observing multiple users may reveal
sensitive information about the relationship among those users.
The specification of privacy preferences related to this kind of threat can be particularly challenging. In addition to
the frequency of co-location events, the presence of other users at the same location may be of importance. For example,
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if Alice and Bob are attending the same event together with many other users, the co-location of Alice and Bob may
not be considered as sensitive by Alice.
The co-location privacy threat applies in particular to check-in based and tracking-based GeoSNs, in which users
have access to precise location information of several other users, and in which anonymity cannot be achieved easily.
4 Protecting Privacy
4.1 Overview
A number of techniques exist that aim to address the privacy threats covered above, but as they occur in traditional
location-based services.
GeoSNs are more challenging than location-based services because they provide new ways to communicate location
data through the publication of geotagged and user tagged content and multiple-user check-ins. Also, GeoSNs are
conceived to expose location-related data, often in real time, to a large number of users, each one being a possible
adversary. Partly for these reasons, absence and co-location privacy are particularly important concepts in GeoSNs.
Therefore, existing techniques may need to be re-engineered to be of use in GeoSNs.
We proceed to briefly report the general principles of techniques from location-based services and then consider their
application to the threats we have identified.
4.2 Spatio-Temporal Data Transformation Techniques
The main techniques can be grouped into spatial and temporal cloaking and encryption. In spatial cloaking a location
is generalized to a region. The idea is that an adversary then only knows that the user is located somewhere within that
region. Techniques differ in the regions they use and how they compute them. Similarly, temporal cloaking consists in
altering the temporal data reported by a user (possibly together with a location). This is usually done by delaying a
service request, or, in the context of content-based GeoSNs, by delaying the publication of a piece of content, so that an
adversary has uncertainty about the actual time associated with the content. Finally, encryption based techniques are
based on the encryption of the location information (or of the whole information being exchanged). Recent proposals
allow a service request to be answered by a service provider without revealing to anybody, including the provider itself,
the location data in the request [2]. Other proposals use multi-party secure computations to provide location privacy in
proximity services [3]. Techniques differ in the encryption functions, in the protocols, and consequently in their costs.
4.3 Selecting and Adapting Techniques to Specific Threats
We consider the applicability of the above general techniques to the main threats that we have identified. For each threat
we refer to our classification of GeoSN to identify general constraints on the applicability of the techniques. A summary
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of the characteristics of each group and the applicable protection techniques is found in Table 1. The information is
based on general properties of the groups and some exceptions may appear in particular services.
content-centric check-in based tracking-based
Features
Content as main information Yes No No
Continuous location update No No Yes
Set of locations Some services Yes No
Multiple user tagging Yes Yes No
Real time Some services Yes Yes
Applicable
techniques
Spatial cloaking Yes No Limited
Temporal cloaking Yes Limited No
Encryption Limited Limited Yes
Table 1: Features and Protection Techniques for GeoSNs
Avoiding re-identification through location
Whenever a user is interested in participating anonymously or through a pseudonym in a GeoSN, the user should be
concerned about this threat. The actual risk of re-identification through location depends on the external information
that an adversary can acquire to match the anonymous users that are in a location at a given time with their identities.
This risk can be reduced with the above techniques, including spatial cloaking where a precise location of a user contained
in a service request (or content publication) is transformed into a region covering the locations of at least k users, so
that any adversary would not be able to associate the request (or content) with a specific user among the k candidates.
Spatial cloaking can be coupled with temporal cloaking in order to find smaller regions with respect to the ones
identified by spatial cloaking alone. Intuitively, by allowing temporal uncertainty within an interval, it is sufficient to
find a region that contained k users as the overall number of users that visited the region within that interval of time.
While a temporal delay may not be tolerable in real-time services, it may be reasonable in some GeoSNs, content-based
GeoSNs.
Protecting location privacy
When the location information is sensitive, spatial cloaking may be applied to obtain regions large enough to lower the
sensitivity of the information to an acceptable level.
Temporal cloaking can also be used to lower the sensitivity of spatio-temporal information. Suppose a user does not
want to reveal that she was located in a particular place at a certain time (maybe because she was expected to be at
another location at that time). This can be classified as a location privacy violation. The threat can be eliminated by
generalizing the temporal information to a larger interval such as an entire day.
In a recent article [4], we propose two solutions based on spatial and temporal cloaking to preserve location privacy in
the context of a content-centric GeoSN that supports user tagging. This setting calls for careful adaptation of techniques
known from traditional location-based services. Users specify their privacy preferences in terms of minimum uncertainty
regions (MURs), which are spatio-temporal regions in which an adversary cannot exclude any of the points as possible
locations of the users. For example, Alice specifies that any resource in which she is tagged should not report the specific
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campus building where she was at 10:30 a.m. today. One solution is to define the combination of the entire campus
region and the time period “this morning” as one of the MURs. When a resource is tagged with multiple users, that
resource should be altered so that the different privacy requirements of all the tagged users are satisfied.
In check-in based services, spatial cannot normally be applied as it would eliminate the significance of the check-in.
Temporal cloaking may be used if the service functionality tolerates a certain time delay. Encryption can also be used
for check-in and content-centric GeoSNs, since the location information can only be decrypted by authorized trusted
recipients. However, encryption introduces additional computational costs are is likely to reduce the utility of the data
to the service providers.
For tracking based services, some solutions based on encryption and/or spatial cloaking have been proposed [3, 5].
However, these techniques are designed for the specific subcategory of proximity-based services.
Protecting absence privacy
The notion of absence privacy is relatively new, and only one proposal for absence privacy protection exists, presented for
content-centric GeoSNs [4]. The privacy preferences expressed by the users are called absence privacy regions (APRs).
The semantics of these regions is that no location information should be disclosed about a user such that it can lead to
the exclusion of any of the points of any of the APRs as possible current location of the user. As already mentioned,
user tags are also considered, and so the publication of a resource should satisfy all users’ privacy preferences. The
proposed technique determines a publication delay for each submitted resource so that it is safe to publish it.
The same principle of delaying the publication of the location information could be applied to check-in based services.
Note however, temporal delay must be very limited to preserve the real-time functionality. For the same real-time
requirement, delaying is not desirable in tracking-based services. Then it is still an open issue to devise an appropriate
technique for absence privacy protection.
Protecting co-location privacy
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of protecting co-location privacy has not yet been investigated in the context
of GeoSNs. In principle, any of the general spatio-temporal data transformation techniques can be applied. Apart
from encryption for which the same arguments given for other threats apply, the other techniques should be adapted
and evaluated with respect to specific co-location privacy preferences. Cloaking may be applied to one or more of the
reported locations, and it may be used both to ensure that co-location involves sufficiently many people and to generalize
the co-location region so that the two locations cannot be considered close to each other with sufficient confidence. The
formalization of co-location as well as the design of protection techniques are actually relevant research open issues.
5 Challenges
There are a number of open problems regarding privacy preservation in GeoSN. In the following we briefly illustrate
some challenges in this direction.
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5.1 Formalization of Threats
The formalization of some of the privacy threats we mentioned in this paper is still an open task. While some initial
work has been done for specific combinations of privacy threats and categories of services, there is still need for a
more expressive formal model that could apply to all the scenarios we addressed. The formalization of the problem of
co-location privacy, that to the best of our knowledge has not been investigated yet, is particularly challenging.
5.2 Specification of Privacy Preferences
The specification of a simple yet flexible way for users to express their privacy preferences in the context of GeoSN,
considering the new threats we have identified, is another challenging task. Appropriate absence and co-location privacy
preferences may not be easy to identify and to express since, as we have illustrated in Section 3, can involve presence or
absence of multiple users, frequency of co-location events, and other aspects.
5.3 Managing Historical Data
Since GeoSNs have been recently introduced, the importance of aspects related to historical geo-referenced data that
is continuously acquired by the service providers and by GeoSN users has not been fully recognized. Historical data
can enable very interesting services as, for example, reminding when two users happened to be in the same place or
attended the same event in the past; or being used to predict future locations of users. However, it can also expose
users to new types of threats; For example, inferences on historical location data can lead to loss of anonymity [6].
This challenge includes modeling and managing approximate trajectories, devising new protection techniques, as well
as possibly introducing policies enforcing data expiration.
6 Conclusion
Several sites and mainstream articles are alerting users about the risks of oversharing in GeoSNs without appropriate
privacy controls [7]. Indeed, in many cases users are not aware that their publishing location information, like when
uploading a picture from a smartphone that automatically geotags photos. The lack of standard privacy controls and
privacy preserving techniques among GeoSNs makes it difficult for users to understand the risks and make appropriate
actions to protect their privacy.
In this paper we provided a classification of current GeoSNs and identified the main privacy threats that users are
exposed to. We have illustrated the state of the art privacy protection techniques that can be applied to prevent these
threats and have analyzed their applicability depending on the GeoSN service being considered. The privacy issues
involved in the participation to a GeoSN are still far to be fully understood and solved, but we hope that this work can
provide a solid background and the identified technical challenges can stimulate further research.
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Figure 2: Features of Existing Services
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